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Events over the past 15 years have resulted in the promulgation of regulations in the United
States to enhance biosecurity by restricting the access to pathogens and toxins (i.e., biolog-
ical select agents and toxins [BSATs]), which pose a severe threat to human being, animal,
or plant health or to animal or plant products, to qualified institutions, laboratories, and
scientists. These regulations also reduce biosafety concerns by imposing specific require-
ments on laboratories working with BSATs. Furthermore, they provide a legal framework for
prosecuting someone who possesses a BSAT illegally. With the implementation of these
regulations has come discussion in the scientific community about the potential of these
regulations to affect the cost of doing BSAT research, hamper research and international
collaborations, or whether it would stop someone with a microbiological background from
isolating many of the select agents from nature.
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“Biosafety and biosecurity measures contribute to preventing
the development, acquisition or use of biological and toxin
weapons. . ..”
–(BWC Meeting of States Parties, 2008)
INTRODUCTION
Recent events have changed the manner in which scientists acquire
and work with pathogenic microorganisms and biological tox-
ins (Morse and Weirich, 2011). Changes in how scientists con-
duct research on biological select agents and toxins (BSATs) have
occurred not only in the United States (U.S.) but internationally
as well. It has been influenced by a number of terrorist events,
which have increased national and international awareness of the
threat of terrorism (including bioterrorism) such as the unsuc-
cessful anthrax attack in Kameido, Tokyo in 1993 (Kaplan, 2000;
Takahashi et al., 2004; Danzig et al., 2011) and the release of the
nerve agent sarin in the subway system of Tokyo in 1995 by the
Aum Shinrikyo (Olsen, 1999; Kaplan, 2000; Danzig et al., 2011);
the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
in 1995 (Smoak and Geiling, 2004); the terrorist attacks using
commercial airlines on September 11, 2001 (Smoak and Geiling,
2004); and the 2001 anthrax attacks in the U.S. (Cole, 2003). In
an effort to control the misuse of these dangerous pathogens and
toxins by those wishing to do harm, the U.S. passed legislation and
promulgated regulations designed to limit unauthorized access
to these agents. Following the implementation of these regula-
tions, Casadevall and Relman (2010) proposed that the policies
may have the unintended consequence of hindering necessary
research on countermeasures and potentially increasing societal
vulnerability to biological attacks and natural epidemics. The
international community has responded in a variety of ways to
the threat of bioterrorism, which provides additional perspectives
on the impact of policy solutions in this area. For example, several
countries have developed and implemented laboratory biosecu-
rity legislation to regulate possession, use and access to biological
agents while other countries use existing biosafety legislation for
pathogen security. This article will cover four areas: (1) a review
of the events that led up to the development of regulations to
restrict access to dangerous pathogens in the U.S.; (2) a discussion
of the laws that framed the regulations; (3) the positive and nega-
tive effects these regulations have had on the scientific community;
and (4) policy options provided by international approaches for
pathogen security.
DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this paper, the following definitions will be
used:
The term pathogen security refers to“measures to reduce the risk
of bioterrorism by making it harder for would-be perpetrators to
gain access to dangerous pathogens and toxins that have legitimate
uses in biomedical research but could be misused for the develop-
ment of biological weapons” (Tucker, 2007). Laboratory biosafety
is defined as “the containment principles, technologies, and prac-
tices that are implemented to prevent the unintentional exposure
to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release” (World Health
Organization, 2004). Biosecurity is defined as “a set of institutional
and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft,
misuse, diversion, or intentional release of biological materials that
could be used with intent to harm people, livestock, agriculture,
or the environment” (World Health Organization, 2004, 2006).
Risk, as it is used to identify agents that may be used for bioter-
rorism, is defined as “the product of probability and impact of an
adverse event” (International Organization for Standardization,
2009). Biological surety (or biosurety) is primarily a U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) program to “safeguard BSAT from theft
and misuse while ensuring that BSAT work is conducted safely”
(Department of the Army, 2008). Dual-use research of concern has
been defined by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecu-
rity (NSABB) “as a research that, based on current understanding,
can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or
technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose
a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other
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Morse Pathogen security
plants, animals, the environment, or materiel” (National Security
Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 2007).
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The events leading up to the promulgation of regulations restrict-
ing access to dangerous human pathogens and biological tox-
ins began in May 1995 when Larry Wayne Harris, a resident
of Lancaster, Ohio with microbiology training and ties to the
white supremacist group Aryan Nations, ordered three vials of
lyophilized Yersinia pestis from the American Type Culture Col-
lection (ATCC) (Stern, 2000; Carus, 2002). At the time, no law
prohibited Mr. Harris or anyone from acquiring this dangerous
pathogen, even though it killed a quarter of Europe’s popula-
tion in the mid-fourteenth century (Stern, 2000). Mr. Harris was
informed by the ATCC that he had to run an established labo-
ratory in order to set up an account and place orders. He faxed
fraudulent information on falsified letterhead stationary that mis-
lead the ATCC to believe that the address, which was actually his
home, was that of a legitimate laboratory. Once the account was
approved, he phoned the ATCC and ordered three vials of Y. pestis,
which were shipped 4 days later. In the meantime, Mr. Harris had
become impatient and called the ATCC to complain that he had
not received the shipment. ATCC personnel became suspicious
when he indicated the nature of his planned experiments and noti-
fied the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). CDC
spoke with Mr. Harris and upon ascertaining that the laboratory
was in his home notified the Ohio Department of Health, which
in turn notified the Lancaster Health Department. The Lancaster
Health Department then notified local law enforcement authori-
ties. Subsequently, three unopened, intact vials containing Y. pestis
were retrieved from the glove compartment of Mr. Harris’s car
by local law enforcement authorities using a search warrant. Mr.
Harris eventually pled guilty to one count of wire fraud.
Shortly after this highly publicized incident, a review of Fed-
eral regulations governing the possession of dangerous pathogens,
initiated by the National Security Council, identified several reg-
ulations that restricted the possession, transfer, and use of high
consequence plant and animal pathogens to qualified institu-
tions, laboratories, and scientists. However, similar regulations that
would restrict access to pathogens, toxins, and recombinant organ-
isms dangerous to human beings were not found. A multi-agency
committee was commissioned by the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to address this issue and
close the loophole. The committee, co-chaired by Frank Young
of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, HHS and Stephen A.
Morse of CDC, HHS included representatives from the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President;
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ); Department of Defense [U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)]; Department of
Agriculture (USDA); Department of Commerce; Environmen-
tal Protection Agency; U. S. Postal Service; National Institutes
of Health; Food and Drug Administration; Office of Emergency
Preparedness; and CDC (Tipple et al., 1997). A framework for
a solution was developed by the committee and presented on
March 6, 1996, during CDC testimony at a hearing of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee convened to examine concerns arising
from the interstate transportation of human pathogens (Tipple
et al., 1997). This framework was subsequently incorporated into
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub-
lic Law 104-132), which was signed into law on April 24, 1996.
Section 511 of this law directed the HHS Secretary (and ultimately
CDC) to promulgate regulations to establish and maintain a list of
biological agents that have the potential to pose a severe threat to
public health and safety. This list subsequently became known as
the Select Agent List. In determining whether to include an agent
on this list, the committee was instructed to use the following cri-
teria: (1) the effect on human health from infection by the agent;
(2) the degree of contagiousness of the agent and the route(s)
of infection; and (3) the availability and effectiveness of vaccines
to prevent disease and medical countermeasures or therapeutics
to treat any illness resulting from infection caused by the agent
(Public Law 104-132, 1996).
On March 12, 1996, CDC representatives attended a meeting
of the Biological Weapons Task Force of the American Society for
Microbiology (ASM), which was chaired by Kenneth I. Berns. The
purpose of this meeting was to discuss the framework that was
presented during CDC testimony at the March 6 meeting of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and its subsequent implementation.
Further input from the scientific community was sought after
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published in the Federal
Register on June 10, 1996 (Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, 1996a). The ASM assisted in this endeavor by contacting
more than 11,000 of its members requesting comments. Pertinent
comments and suggestions that were received from ASM members
as well as from other scientists were addressed in the Preamble to
the Final Rule, and many were incorporated into the Final Rule
(Department of Health and Human Services, 1996b). The new reg-
ulation required those shipping or receiving (i.e., transfer) BSAT to
register with the CDC. The regulation also required that safety pro-
cedures for agent transfer be established and enforced, that those
handling these agents be properly trained,and that there are proper
laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of the agents. In order
to accomplish this, the CDC/NIH publication“Biosafety in Micro-
biological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), 4th Edition” was
incorporated by reference into the regulation. The regulation also
would require safeguards to prevent unlawful access to the agents.
It is important to note that congress stated in PL 104-132 that
the regulation had to be designed to provide for the appropriate
availability of BSATs for legitimate purposes such as research and
education (Public Law 104-132, 1996). Access to BSATs was to be
restricted for those with no legitimate reason while, at the same
time, maintaining availability to those with a legitimate reason.
The new regulations were incorporated into Part 72 of Title 42
of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R. Part 72) by which the
CDC regulated the interstate shipment of etiologic agents. The
final regulation (42 C.F.R. Parts 72.6, 72.7, and Appendix A [the
Select Agent list]) became effective April 15, 1997 and was in effect
until February 7, 2003.
The regulatory climate changed after September 11, 2001 and
the subsequent dissemination of Bacillus anthracis spores through
the U.S. mail that resulted in 22 cases of anthrax and 5 deaths (Cole,
2003). During the ensuing investigation, the FBI contacted CDC’s
Select Agent Program to request a list of all laboratories possessing
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B. anthracis, in particular those that possessed the Ames strain,
which was the strain isolated and identified in all of the human
anthrax cases as well as environmental samples resulting from the
attack (Keim et al., 2011). However, the list was probably incom-
plete as only those laboratories that had transferred or received the
agent since April 1997 had been required to register with the CDC
Select Agent Program. This fact highlighted, from a law enforce-
ment perspective, a loophole in the Select Agent Regulation that
needed to be corrected through legislation.
Controls to access select agents were strengthened after the
anthrax mailing incident. On October 26, 2001, Public Law 107-56
entitled “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act was signed by President George W. Bush. The
USA PATRIOT Act affected who could handle or possess BSATs.
Section 817 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended Chapter 10 (Bio-
logical Weapons) of Title 18, United Sates Code (U.S.C.). The first
change incorporated as subparagraph (b) in Section 275 [18 U.S.C.
Part 175(b)] stated: “Whoever knowingly possesses any biological
agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that,
under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified by a prophy-
lactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.”In the context of subparagraph 175(b), the terms“biolog-
ical agent”and“toxin”did not include a biological agent or toxin in
its naturally occurring environment as long as the biological agent
or toxin had not been cultivated, collected, or otherwise extracted
from its natural source (Public Law 107-56, 2001). Some examples
that might have been problematic without this understanding are
the presence of a plague-infected rodent on one’s property or the
extraction of castor oil from castor bean seeds with the resulting
residue (i.e., mash) containing the toxin ricin. The second state-
ment in a new section 175b restricted who could possess BSATs. It
stated that “No restricted person described in subsection (b) shall
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
or affecting commerce, any biological agent or toxin, or receive
any biological agent or toxin that has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce, if the biological agent or toxin
is listed as a Select Agent (Public Law 107-56, 2001).” The cate-
gories of restricted persons delineated in Section 175b are listed in
Table 1 and the current Select Agent List is shown in Table 2.
Another law that would impact the regulation of BSATs,
the “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002” (PL 107-188), was signed by President Bush
on June 12, 2002. Title II of this Act directed the HHS Secretary
to: “(1) establish and maintain (and review at least biennially) a
list of BSATs that have the potential to pose a severe threat to
public health and safety; (2) provide for the regulation of trans-
fers of listed agents and toxins; (3) provide for the establishment
and enforcement of standards and procedures governing the pos-
session and use of listed BSATs; (4) require registration with the
HHS Secretary of the possession, use, and transfer of listed BSATs;
and (5) provide appropriate safeguards and security requirements
for persons possessing, using, or transferring a listed agent or
toxin commensurate with the risk such agent or toxin poses to
public health and safety (Public Law 107-188, 2002).”It also autho-
rized the HHS Secretary to inspect the facilities of persons subject
Table 1 | Categories of restricted persons as described in the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001a.
A person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year.
A person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable for a
term exceeding 1 year.
A person who is a fugitive from justice.
A person who is an unlawful user of any controlled substance (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).
An alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States.
A person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been
committed to any mental institution.
An alien (other than one lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who
is a national of a country as to which the Secretary of State has made a
determination (that remains in effect) that such country has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism.
A person who has been discharged from the Armed Services of the
United States under dishonorable conditions.
aAbstracted from Public Law 107-56 (2001).
to the above requirements to ensure their compliance with the
regulations.
In addition, the HHS Secretary, in consultation with the Attor-
ney General and now with the Secretary of Homeland Security as
well, established safeguards and security requirements for persons
wishing to posses, use, or transfer a BSAT. These requirements dealt
with limiting access to BSATs by ensuring that registered persons:
“(1) provide access to only those individuals whom the registered
person determines has a legitimate need to handle or use BSATs;
(2) provide names and other identifying information (e.g., fin-
gerprints) to both the HHS Secretary and Attorney General for
those individuals identified as needing access; (3) deny access to
BSATs by individuals whom the Attorney General has identified
as “restricted persons” as defined in the USA PATRIOT Act (see
Table 1); and (4) limit or deny access to BSATs to an individual
who is reasonably suspected by any Federal law enforcement or
intelligence agency of (a) committing a crime set forth in section
2332b(g)(5) of Title 18, U.S.C.; (b) knowing involvement with an
organization that engages in domestic or international terrorism
or with any other organization that engages in intentional crimes
of violence, or (c) being an agent of a foreign power (as defined in
section 1801 of Title 50, U.S.C.) (Public Law 107-188, 2002). The
results of the Attorney General’s security risk assessment (SRA)
are provided to the HHS Secretary (specifically to the Director of
CDC’s Division of Select Agents and Toxins) where the determina-
tion as to whether the individual is to be granted or denied access to
BSATs is made. The revised select agent regulations are found in 42
C.F.R. Part 73 (Select Agent Regulation, 42 C.F.R. Part 73). At the
end of 2012, there were over 400 registered facilities and more than
13,171 individuals (including scientists, technicians, and various
support personnel) approved for access to select agents.
Another major change is found in Subtitle B (Agricultural
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002) of PL 107-188, which directs
the Secretary of the USDA to establish and maintain a list of BSATs
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Table 2 | HHS and USDA select agents and toxinsa.
HHS select agents and toxins
Abrin
Botulinum neurotoxinsb
Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridiumb
Conotoxins (short, paralytic alpha conotoxins containing the following
amino acid sequence: X1CCX2PACGX3X4X5X6CX7)c
Coxxiella burnetti
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus
Diacetoxyscirpenol
Eastern Equine Encephalitis virusd
Ebola virusb
Francisella tularensisb
Lassa fever virus
Lujo virus
Marburg virusb
Monkeypox virusd
Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic
influenza virus containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight
gene segments (Reconstructed 1918 influenza virus)
Ricin
Rickettsia prowazekii
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
Saxitoxin
South American Hemorrhagic Fever viruses (Chapare, Guanarito, Junin,
Machupo, Sabia)
Staphylococcal enterotoxins A, B, C, D, E subtypes
T-2 toxin
Tetrodotoxin
Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses (Far Eastern subtype,
Siberian subtype)
Kyasanur Forest disease virus
Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus
Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)b
Variola minor virus (Alastrim)b
Yersinia pestisb
Overlap select agents and toxins
Bacillus anthracisb
Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain
Brucella abortus
Brucella melitensis
Brucella suis
Burkholderia malleib
Burkholderia pseudomalleib
Hendra virus
Nipah virus
Rift Valley fever virus
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virusd
(Continued)
USDA select agents and toxins
African horse sickness virus
African swine fever virus
Avian influenza virusd
Classical swine fever virus
Foot-and-mouth disease virusb
Goat pox virus
Lumpy skin disease virus
Mycoplasma capricolumd
Mycoplasma mycoidesd
Newcastle disease virusd,e
Peste des petite ruminants virus
Rinderpest virusb
Sheep pox virus
Swine vesicular disease virus
USDA plant protection and quarantine select agents and toxins
Peronosclerospora philippinensis (Peronosclerospora sacchari )
Phoma glycinicola (formerly Pyrenochaeta glycines)
Ralstonia solanacearum
Rathayibacter toxicus
Sclerophthora rayssiae
Synchytrium endobioticum
Xanthomonas oryzae
aInformation obtained at: http://www.selectagents.gov/SelectAgentsandToxins
List.html.
bDenotes Tier 1 agent.
cC, cysteine residues are all present as disulfides, with the 1st and 3rd cysteine,
and the 2nd and 4th cysteine forming specific disulfide bridges; The consensus
sequence includes known toxins α-MI and α-GI (shown above), as well as α-GlA,
Ac1.1a. α-CnlB; X1, any amino acid(s) or Des-X; X2, asparagine of histidine; P,
proline; A, alanine; G, glycine; X3, arginine or lysine; X4, asparagine, histidine,
lysine, arginine, tyrosine, phenylalanine, or tryptophan; X5, tyrosine, phenylala-
nine, or tryptophan; X6, serine, threonine, glutamate, aspartate, glutamine, or
asparagine; X7, any amino acid(s) or Des-X and; “Des-X”, an amino acid does not
have to be present at this position. For example, if a peptide sequence were
XCCHPA, then the related peptide CCHPA would be designated as Des-X.
dSelect agents that meet any of the following criteria are excluded from the
requirements of this part: any low pathogenic strain of avian influenza virus,
South American genotype of eastern equine encephalitis virus, west African
clade of Monkey pox virus, any strain of Newcastle disease virus, which does not
meet the criteria for virulent Newcastle disease virus, all subspecies Mycoplasma
capricolum except subspecies capripneumoniae (contagious caprine pleurop-
neumonia), all subspecies Mycoplasma mycoides except subspecies mycoides
small colony (Mmm SC) (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia), any subtypes of
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus except for subtypes lAB or lC, and Vesicu-
lar stomatitis virus (exotic); Indiana subtypes VSV-lN2, VSV-lN3, provided that the
individual or entity can verify that the agent is within the exclusion category.
eA virulent Newcastle disease virus (avian paramyxovirus serotype 2) has an intrac-
erebral pathogenicity index in day-old chicks (Gallus gallus) of 0.7 or greater or has
an amino acid sequence at the fusion (F) protein cleavage site that is consistent
with virulent strains of Newcastle disease virus. A failure to detect a cleavage site
that is consistent with virulent strains does not confirm the absence of a virulent
strain.
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that he/she determines has the potential to pose a severe threat to
animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products. The criteria
for inclusion are described in Public Law 107-188 (2002). For the
animal pathogens they include: (1) availability and effectiveness
of pharmacotherapy and prophylaxis to treat and prevent any ill-
ness; (2) economic impact; inclusion on the Office International
des Epizooties (OIE) A and B lists; and (3) presence on the Aus-
tralia Group List (2014). For plant pathogens, they include: (1)
the effect of exposure to the agent on plant health and on the
production and marketability of plant products; (2) the ability to
detect the agent and diagnose the infection during its early stages;
(3) whether the agent was non-native or exotic; and (4) the eco-
nomic importance of the host plant. The non-biological criteria
of economic consequences and effect on international trade agree-
ments were of paramount importance when considering agents for
inclusion on the USDA BSAT list (Table 2) (Pimental et al., 2000).
Thus, these agents are designated Select Agents not because they
necessarily pose a threat to animal health but because they pose
a threat to national security (National Research Council, 2010).
This is in contrast to the HHS list where the impact on public
health and safety was a primary factor for inclusion. The USDA
promulgated two select agent regulations: 9 C.F.R. Part 121, which
governs BSATs that have the potential to pose a severe threat to
animal health, or to animal products (Select Agent Regulation, 9
C.F.R. Part 121); and 7 C.F.R. Part 331, which governs BSATs that
pose a severe threat to plant health or plant products (Select Agent
Regulation, 7 C.F.R. Part 331). The three select agent regulations
are virtually identical with respect to requirements and how they
are structured. BSATs that are on both the HHS and USDA Select
Agent lists are called “overlap agents and toxins” and are jointly
regulated by both HHS and USDA (see Table 2).
Shortly after the passage of the Public Law 107-188, CDC’s
Division of Select Agents and Toxins and USDA’s Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) jointly established the
Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) to coordinate the regulation
of BSATs. The FSAP is responsible for carrying out the provi-
sions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act through three select agent
regulations (42 CFR Part 73, 7 CFR Part 331, and 9 CFR Part
121). FSAP promotes laboratory safety and security through reg-
ulations, registering laboratories, conducting onsite inspections,
and providing guidance to the regulated community. FSAP also
approves and tracks shipments of BSATs, investigates reports of
their theft, loss, or release, collects information on BSATs identi-
fied by diagnostic laboratories, and provides select agent facility
status information to federal decision makers during responses to
natural and intentional disasters (Blaine, 2012).
Some government agencies working with BSATs have devel-
oped and implemented additional, more stringent safety, security,
and agent accountability programs for their laboratories (The
President, 2009; Shurtleff et al., 2012), sometimes in response
to adverse press coverage. For example, findings during the
Amerithrax investigation (United States Department of Justice,
2010; Willman, 2011) led the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
to issue a security directive entitled“Safeguarding Biological Select
Agents and Toxins” (Directive 5210.88) for military laboratories
(Carr et al., 2004; Pastel et al., 2006) working with BSATs (United
States Department of Defense, 2004). In accordance with Directive
5210.88, the U.S. Army developed and implemented Army Regu-
lation 50-1 (Department of the Army, 2008), a comprehensive
biosurety program for all Department of the Army laboratories
working with BSATs, including those at USAMRIID, Ft. Detrick,
Frederick, MD, USA, which were at the center of the Amerithrax
investigation.
SELECT AGENT LIST
The Select Agent List is considered by some to be primarily an
instrument of biosecurity although it can be argued that the Select
Agent Regulation(s) also reduce biosafety concerns through the
regulation of laboratories working with BSATs (Casadevall and
Relman, 2010).
The initial list of BSATs, which was part of the original regula-
tion in 1997, contained 42 agents and toxins including some agents
that could infect both human beings and animals (e.g., B. anthracis
and Y. pestis), but did not include those affecting only animals or
plants. The original BSATs were selected (i.e., Select Agents) from
the Australia Group List of Human and Animal Pathogens and
Toxins for Export Control (Australia Group List, 2014) with input
from experts from inside and outside the government. Considera-
tions for selection by the committee included prior weaponization,
effect on human health, infectious dose, degree of contagiousness,
route(s) of infection, and the availability of effective medical coun-
termeasures and vaccines. There was extensive discussion with
ASM as well as input from other scientists during the comment
period The Australia Group List currently consists of 59 agents
that can infect both human beings and animals (37 viruses, 20
bacteria, and 2 fungi) and 19 toxins (Australia Group List, 2014).
The select agent regulations require biennial review of the list
and agents can be added or removed based on new informa-
tion or better understanding. For example, the reconstructed 1918
influenza virus was added in 2005 and SARS-associated coron-
avirus (SARS-CoV) was added in 2013. Information provided by
both the science and security communities is evaluated during the
review process. The current BSAT list consists of 65 agents and
toxins of which 34 are HHS BSATs, 10 are overlap BSATs, 14 are
USDA BSATs, and 7 are USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine
BSATs (Table 2).
The current BSATs differ significantly in their pathogenicity
and ability to be utilized as an agent of bioterrorism, and there-
fore, the risk that they might pose to human being, animal, and
plant health and safety varies significantly (National Science Advi-
sory Board for Biosecurity, 2009). However, the 2005 Select Agent
Final Rule applied the same regulatory controls regardless of the
agent. Casadevall and Relman and the NSABB have noted that
this broad application of the regulations has made it difficult to
conduct legitimate research using less pathogenic BSATs (National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 2009, Casadevall and Rel-
man, 2010). Therefore, the NSABB in a 2009 report recommended
that the list of BSATs be reduced or stratified (National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 2009). Subsequently, Executive
Order 13546, which was signed on July 2, 2010, directed the Secre-
taries of HHS and Agriculture to designate those BSATs that pose
the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with the greatest potential
for mass casualties or devastating effects to the economy, critical
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infrastructure, or public confidence as Tier 1 agents and toxins
(see Table 2) and amend their respective regulations to establish
security standards specific to Tier 1 agents and toxins (The Presi-
dent, 2010). A federal panel using a number of criteria including
information from the intelligence community selected 13 agents
deemed to be Tier 1 (Bhattacharjee, 2011).
The finding that the B. anthracis spores used in the 2001 anthrax
letters presumably came from a federal laboratory facility (United
States Department of Justice, 2010) played an important role
in designing the security changes to address the insider threat.
Specific changes in the regulations related to Tier 1 agents are
described in Table 3. The NSABB also issued a number of rec-
ommendations related to hiring and employment practices and to
fostering an awareness of biosecurity and promoting responsible
conduct as an approach to reducing the insider threat (National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 2011). Some laborato-
ries developed and implemented personnel reliability programs
to address the insider threat prior to the amendment of the
regulations (Higgins et al., 2013).
IMPACT OF THE SELECT AGENT REGULATIONS
Determining the positive or negative impact of these regulations
in preventing terrorists or criminals from accessing dangerous
pathogens has challenges. Difficulties in linking information with
impact, availability of data, and verification of anecdotal state-
ments are among the reasons. An examination of the theft, loss,
and release incident reports (APHIS/CDC Form 3) submitted to
APHIS or CDC between 2004 and 2010 revealed no reports deal-
ing with BSAT theft (Henkel et al., 2012). Among the 727 reports
received, 88 (12%) were loss reports and 639 (88%) were release
reports. The final disposition of the 88 loss reports indicated that
there was one confirmed loss of a BSAT (Coccidioides immitis)
during shipment (out of 3412 BSAT transfers conducted during
that time). An investigation of this incident by the FBI concluded
that it was destroyed during processing at a commercial shipping
facility in the U.S. (Henkel et al., 2012). One positive impact of the
regulations may be that there is currently a monitoring program
in place that can help to foster sustained security in U.S. labs.
The regulations were “intended to provide a potential bene-
fit to society by both restricting access to certain microorganisms
and toxins and creating a legal infrastructure for the prosecu-
tion of individuals who are found to be in possession of these
organisms and toxins without proper registration”(Casadevall and
Relman, 2010). These authors further propose that these regula-
tions“mitigate risk by imposing a strict regulatory environment on
laboratories working with select agents” (Casadevall and Relman,
2010). They agree that the regulations make an important con-
tribution to biosecurity for those microorganisms that no longer
circulate in the environment (e.g., variola virus) and for those
that, until recently, were considered difficult to isolate from natural
sources (e.g., Ebola virus). However, they and others [e.g., Ostfield
(2009)] correctly note that many of the select agents are endemic to
the U.S. (and elsewhere) and can be isolated from natural sources
by individuals with some microbiological training. Thus, the regu-
lation may be of limited benefit in cases where the select agent can
be isolated from the natural environment and perhaps provide a
false sense of security. This was one of the main arguments used by
proponents for the stratification of the Select Agent List according
Table 3 | Select agent regulation (42 CFR Part 73, 7 CFR Part 331, and 9
CFR Part 121) requirements for working withTier 1 BSATsa.
Section Requirement
15(b) Entities with Tier 1 select agents and toxins must conduct
annual insider threat awareness briefings on how to
identify and report suspicious behaviors (training).
12(d) The biosafety plan must include an occupational health
program for individuals with access to Tier 1 agents and
toxins, and those individuals must be enrolled in the
occupational health program (occupational health).
14(b) Entities with Tier 1 agents must provide the following
additional Information in the incident response plan: (i) A
plan for how the Entity will respond to the activation of the
alarm system or Information on an intruder in the
laboratory; (ii) Procedures on how the entity will notify the
appropriate federal, state, or local law enforcement
agencies of suspicious activity that may be criminal in
nature and related to the entity, its personnel, or its select
agents or toxins (incident response plan).
11(f)(2) Entities must describe procedures for how an entity’s
Responsible Official (RO) will coordinate their efforts with
the entity’s safety and security professionals to ensure
security of Tier 1 select agents and toxins and share
appropriate, relevant information, which may affect the
security plan (security plan).
11(f)(4)(iv) A requirement for three barriers (physical structure that is
designed to prevent access to Tier 1 agents by
unauthorized persons) (security plan).
11(f)(4)(v) A requirement for intrusion detection system (security
plan).
11(f)(4)(viii) Entity must determine the response time for response
force (security plan).
11(f)(4)(vii) Entity must describe procedures to ensure that security is
maintained in the event of the failure of the access control
system due to power disruption (security plan).
11(f)(1);11(f)(3) Persons with access to Tier 1 BSATs must have additional
pre-access suitability and on-going assessment
requirements (security plan).
11(f)(4)(ii) Limit access to laboratories and storage facilities outside
of normal business hours to only those specifically
approved by RO or designee(s) (security plan).
11(f)(4)(iii) Procedures must be in place for screening visitors, their
property, and vehicles at the entry and exit points to the
areas registered for Tier 1 BSATs (security plan).
aSpecific guidance for these and other requirements of the Select Agent Reg-
ulations can be found in the following documents: Guidance for Meeting the
Training Requirement of the Select Agent Regulations, October 1, 2012 edi-
tion; Occupational Health Program Guidance Document for Working with Tier
1 Select Agents and Toxins, October 1, 2012 edition; Incidence Response Plan
Guidance Document, September 4, 2014 edition; and, Security Guidance for
Select Agent or Toxin Facilities, July 5, 2013 edition, which can be found at
http://www.selectagents.gov.
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology | Biosafety and Biosecurity January 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 83 | 6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Morse Pathogen security
to the agents’ potential use as a biothreat agent, with regulatory
requirements and procedures calibrated against this stratification
(National Research Council, 2010).
To date, many of the proposed negative impacts of these regu-
lations are based on anecdotal evidence. There is, however, some
work to document any unintentional consequences of the regula-
tory policies. Casadevall and Relman (2010) suggested that many
microbial collections were destroyed by their curators when these
regulations came into effect in the U.S. rather than register. To cir-
cumvent the loss of biodiversity, the Select Agent Program worked
hard to find “homes” for any culture collection that entities no
longer wanted to retain as a result of the new regulation. How-
ever, additional data are needed to determine the impact of the
regulations on microbial collections. For example, it is not clear
how many microbial collections were lost prior to these regula-
tions because they were not funded in a sustainable manner. It
is also possible that it was not the regulations themselves that
caused destruction but the increased cost of maintenance under
regulatory constraints.
Casadevall and Relman (2010) also suggested that these reg-
ulations could or have impaired work on BSATs. In this regard,
over 20% of select agent researchers surveyed in 2004 and 2005
noted that the regulations were affecting their ability to collaborate
domestically and internationally, and about 40% claimed that they
had to use research funding to make required security upgrades
(Sandia National Laboratories, 2006). Shurtleff et al. (2012) sug-
gested that the regulations (i.e., both the Select Agent and Army
regulations) impeded work in BSL-4 laboratories by adding extra
requirements. A 2006 Stimson Center Study found that the main
complaints of select agent researchers were monetary, the time and
costs of security upgrades and procedures, bureaucratic time sinks,
the tedium of inventorying samples, and barriers to international
collaboration (Fischer, 2006). Nevertheless in a recent survey, an
overwhelming number of investigators (93.4%) responded that
these agents should be regulated and that the SRA was the most
effective component of the regulation (Sutton, 2009). On the other
hand, many respondents were worried that inadvertently violat-
ing these regulations would have a negative impact on their careers
and potentially thwart the goals of the regulations.
Dias et al. (2010) conducted a bibliometric analysis of the B.
anthracis and Ebola virus archival literature to determine whether
there were negative consequences of the underlying legislation on
research with these agents. After correcting for papers that would
not be subject to these regulations (e.g., review articles), the num-
ber of annual peer reviewed publications increased markedly after
the regulation went into effect. The amount of research funding
also increased post-September 11 (Dias et al., 2010). However, the
cost per publication, using funding amounts identified in both
the NIH CRISP database and the RAND Corporation’s RaDIUS
database, also increased. Before 2002, the average number of B.
anthracis research papers per million dollars of funding was 17.
After 2002, the average number was only 3 papers per million dol-
lars. For Ebola virus, before 2002 the average number of papers per
million dollars was 14, which subsequently fell to 6 papers per mil-
lion dollars. Research papers on a non-regulated control organism
(Klebsiella pneumoniae) declined from 26 to 17 per million dollars
of funding. While the authors recognize the softness of their data,
they claim that there has been a two- to fivefold increase in doing
select agent research. However, this increase cannot be attributed
solely to the costs associated with the Select Agent regulations as
this study did not consider the nature of the research being con-
ducted, the increased cost of purchasing small laboratory animals
and primates, and of conducting animal studies at BSL-3 and -
4. Moreover, there has been a trend over the past few years of
academic institutions requiring investigators to put an increasing
proportion of their salaries on research grants. Based on the above
findings, it is clearly apparent that further analysis is needed to
accurately determine the financial impact.
In the wake of the passage of the underlying legislation of
the Select Agent regulations, more than one high-profile scien-
tist announced publicly that they would abandon select agent
research rather than fulfill the legal requirements (Gaudioso and
Salerno, 2004). It is possible that some scientists who have been
working with these agents prior to the regulations bristled at the
changes brought by the regulations while those who entered the
field after the regulations went into effect have been more accept-
ing. Controlling for funding, Dias et al. (2010) actually detected an
influx of new scientists that entered “live-pathogen” select agent
research after the laws were passed, but many did not stay (these
may be graduate students who changed fields after completing
their degree). An influx of new scientists was not observed among
control organism researchers. However, a pattern of decline was
observed in international collaboration on B. anthracis but not
Ebola virus research. Overall, Dias et al. (2010) found that select
agent research became less centralized (i.e., involved more institu-
tions) after the laws were enacted and military institutions became
more collaborative in “live-pathogen” B. anthracis and Ebola virus
research.
In phone interviews conducted to determine whether their
findings were consistent with individual experiences, Dias et al.
(2010) found that research partnerships were not affected by the
regulations, and that most of the respondents perceived increased
collaboration and diversity of expertise within the field after 2002.
However, they pointed out that the collaborative process was made
significantly slower and more tedious due to the restrictions placed
on organism transfer (particularly with foreign partners) and lab-
oratory access. Unfortunately, Dias et al. (2010) did not ascertain
whether difficulty in obtaining an Export License (both in the U.S.
and abroad) for BSAT materials was a significant factor but they
did note that nearly all respondents complained of the increased
paperwork they were legally obligated to fill out.
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES
There have been a number of international efforts to promote
biosafety and biosecurity due to the threat of bioterrorism and
emerging infectious diseases. The 2004 edition of the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) Laboratory Biosafety Manual contains, for
the first time, a discussion of biosecurity (World Health Organiza-
tion, 2004). Microorganisms are classified by risk group (Table 4).
The risk groups correspond to the biosafety level required to
safely work with the microorganism (e.g., Risk Group 3 requires
biosafety level 3 containment and practices). Laboratory biose-
curity is viewed as a complement to laboratory biosafety in that
while they mitigate different risks, they share the common goal of
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Table 4 | Classification of infective microorganisms by risk groupa.
Hazard
group
Definition Examples
1 An organism that is most unlikely to cause human disease Non-mammalian associated microorganisms
2 An organism that may cause human disease and which might be a
hazard to laboratory workers but is unlikely to spread in the community
Legionella spp., Clostridium botulinum, Staphylococcus aureus,
Herpes simplex, Influenza virus
3 An organism that may cause severe human disease and presents a
serious hazard to laboratory workers
Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Mycobacterium tuberculosis,
Salmonella typhi, Shigella dysenteriae
4 An organism that causes severe human disease and is a serious hazard
to laboratory workers. It may present a high risk or spread to the
community and there is usually no effective prophylaxis or treatment
Variola, Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, Machupo, Junin
aModified from World Health Organization (2004) and Hoffman (1994).
keeping biological agents safe and secure in the areas where they
are used and stored (World Health Organization, 2006).
Because most countries have never had to respond to a bioter-
rorism incident, the level of public awareness and concern about
this issue is likely to be considerably less than in the U.S. While
many countries (e.g., Germany) experienced anthrax hoaxes in
2001, they were quickly discovered to be false alarms. Germany did
not respond to the events of 2001 by introducing new biosecurity
legislation as was done in the U.S. (Tucker, 2007). Tucker (2007)
points out that while the U.S. framed bioterrorism prevention as
a security issue and responded by tightening controls on a tar-
geted list of BSATs that could be used as weapons, Germany (and
a number of other countries) viewed the threat of bioterrorism
mainly in public health terms, as a subset of the broader chal-
lenge of infectious diseases (Tucker, 2007). So while the U.S. Select
Agent Regulation focuses primarily on pathogens that may be
used by a bioterrorist, Germany relies on a framework of biosafety
laws and regulations, dating back to 1900, which are designed to
ensure the safe handling of dangerous pathogens by legitimate
researchers and to minimize the risks to public health and the
environment from legitimate research activities. Among the Ger-
man laws related to biosafety are The Reich Epidemic Act of 1900
requiring scientists wishing to work with dangerous pathogens to
meet certain educational requirements and to be licensed by the
state; the Genetic Engineering Act of 1993; the Plant Protection
Act of 1998; the Regulation on Health and Safety at Work Act of
1996; the Regulation on Health and Safety Related to Activities
Involving Biological Agents of 1999; the Infection Protection Act
of 2000; and the Animal Infectious Disease Act of 2001. These
and other laws and regulations governing biosafety were devel-
oped incrementally over more than a century. Germany currently
regulates personnel and/or facilities for all of the agents designated
as Hazard Group 3 or 4 and require the equivalent of a security
clearance for those working with Hazard Group 4 agents (National
Research Council, 2009). Because of this approach, the total num-
ber of microbial and toxin agents covered by German biosafety
regulations is larger than the U.S. Select Agent List (Tucker, 2007).
Other countries using a similar approach are Canada and Switzer-
land (National Research Council, 2009). Some countries regulate
via lists of “select agents,” which vary in length, composition, and
requirements. Examples of such lists are Australia (22 agents);
South Korea (32 agents); France (37 agents); Japan (51 agents),
and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (82 agents) (National Research
Council, 2009).
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the U.S., the U.K.
passed the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 (http:
//www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm), which shifted
the focus from laboratory biosafety to biosecurity. Part VII tight-
ens controls on access to 82 dangerous pathogens and toxins that
are specified in Schedule 5 of the Act, establishes the power to vet
personnel working in laboratories with these agents and mandates
security requirements (National Research Council, 2003). Sched-
ule 5 currently lists 41 viruses, 4 rickettsiae, 21 bacteria, 14 toxins,
and 2 fungi that are subject to this Act.
There have also been increased multinational efforts to improve
biosafety and biosecurity in order to prevent or deter the use of
biological agents as weapons and to achieve global health secu-
rity. These efforts are centered on the implementation of inter-
national instruments for both non-proliferation [e.g., Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) and United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540)] and public health [e.g., WHO
International Health Regulations (IHR)]. A full discussion of these
agreements is beyond the scope of this paper and the interested
reader is referred to Bakanidze et al. (2010) for additional infor-
mation. All 192 UN Member States are required to meet the core
capacity requirements of the IHR, which entered into force in 2007
(International Health Regulations, 2005). “Core Capacity 8,” the
laboratory core capacity, emphasizes the concept that building lab-
oratory capacity to support a public health system requires a strong
focus on biosafety and biosecurity. The BWC, which has 170 States
Parties, entered into force in 1975 (http://www.unog.ch/bwc). The
BWC States Parties hold Review Conferences every 5 years in
an effort to enhance compliance. At the 2008 BWC meeting of
States Parties, it was stated that “biosafety and biosecurity mea-
sures contribute to preventing the development, acquisition, or
use of biological and toxin weapons and are appropriate means
of implementing the BWC” and also that “pursuing biosafety and
biosecurity measures could also contribute to the fulfillment of
other respective international obligations and agreements, such
as the revised IHR of the WHO.” UNSCR 1540 was adopted
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unanimously on April 28, 2004 and established for the first time
legally binding obligations on all UN Member States to “develop
and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD),” which includes biological weapons
(UN Security Council, 2004). UNSCR 1540 also recognizes that
non-state proliferation is a threat to the peace under the terms of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and requires every UN Member
State to criminalize various forms of non-state actor involvement
in WMD and its related activities in its domestic legislation and
to enforce such legislation. An ad hoc committee (known as the
1540 Committee) was involved in the implementation of this res-
olution. As part of its mission, it developed matrices to be used
as tools to help UN Member States implement the resolution.
The matrix for biological weapons and related materials identified
the areas where domestic controls should be implemented and
enforced (Table 5).
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Security and defense against biological threats, whether natural
or intentional will most likely continue to be a high priority for
the foreseeable future (Ryan and Glarum, 2008). Carus compiled
data suggesting that there is an increased interest in biological
agents by criminals and terrorists (Carus, 2002). He identified
four methods used by criminals and terrorists to acquire biolog-
ical agents, either: (1) purchase them from legitimate suppliers;
(2) steal them; (3) produce them; or (4) use material of natural
origin contaminated with biological agents (Carus, 2002). Pur-
chase from a legitimate supplier and theft accounted for more
than half of known instances. However, bioterrorism is a multi-
faceted problem requiring a multifaceted solution. In response to
the threat and actual use of a biological agent by a terrorist, the
U.S. passed legislation and promulgated regulations (i.e., Select
Agent Regulations) to restrict access to pathogens that pose a risk
to human beings, animals, plants, or animal and plant products to
those with a legitimate need who have been approved to receive,
ship, or possess a BSAT. The regulations also require the theft, loss,
or release of one of the BSATs to be reported to the Select Agent
Program. Background checks and personnel reliability programs
Table 5 | Areas where domestic controls should be implemented and
enforced in order to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons
under UN Security Council Resolution 1540a.
Measures to account for secure production
Measures to account for secure use
Measures to account for secure storage
Measures to account for secure transport
Regulations for physical protection of facilities/materials/transports
Licensing/registration of facilities/persons handling biological materials
Reliability check of personnel
Measures to account for/secure/physically protect means of delivery
Regulations for genetic engineering work
Other legislation/regulations related to safety and security for biological
materials
aAdapted from Bakanidze et al. (2010).
were instituted to reduce the insider threat. Other countries have
addressed these issues through biosafety regulations and laws. The
IHR and UNSCR 1540 has fostered international awareness of
the global threat of bioterrorism and emphasized the necessity for
member states to strengthen the biosecurity and biosafety of their
laboratories.
In the literature, there is discussion that the current regulations
may have the unintended consequences of impeding legitimate
research by imposing additional requirements, slowing interna-
tional collaborations and increasing the cost of research. Some
scientists and policy experts (Ostfield, 2009; Casadevall and Rel-
man,2010) have noted that these regulations will not stop someone
with microbiological skills from isolating a BSAT from nature,
but do provide a legal framework for prosecuting someone who
possesses a BSAT illegally. To facilitate legitimate BSAT research
that does not require highly virulent organisms, the select agent
regulations established a procedure by which attenuated or avir-
ulent strains that do not pose a severe threat to public health
and safety, animal health, or animal products may be excluded
from the requirements of the select agent regulations. Exclusion is
based upon consultations with subject matter experts and a review
of relevant published studies and unpublished data provided by
the entity requesting the exclusion. The exclusion of BSATs has
been occurring for more than a decade. Excluded bacteria and
viruses are shown in Table 6. The availability of excluded strains
has facilitated research on many of these agents.
The development of codes of conduct and the education of sci-
entists about dual-use research of concern are additional efforts by
the scientific community that may strengthen biosecurity without
the development of additional laws and regulations. The life sci-
ences community previously set a precedent for self-governance in
the way it addressed potential safety and environmental dangers
in the then-fledgling field of genetic engineering. A conference in
Asilomar, California in 1975 (Berg et al., 1975) brought recom-
binant DNA science and technology to the public’s attention and
led to the development of guidelines by a new National Institutes
of Health Committee, the Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee, that governs all recombinant DNA work at institutions
that receive any federal funds for that purpose. The recombinant
DNA guidelines addressed how to conduct experiments using this
technology safely and forbid the performance of certain types of
experiments. The flexibility afforded by guidelines means that they
can be updated as new scientific judgments on risk are made.
The use of these guidelines has expanded beyond institutions that
receive government funds. By being proactive, scientists avoided
restrictive legislation.
Many policy makers and scientists believe that the develop-
ment, documentation, and reinforcement of norms regarding the
beneficial aspects of science as well as identifying those activi-
ties that are fundamentally intolerable are best done by scien-
tists (National Security Council, 2009). The National Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats (National Security Council, 2009)
seeks to facilitate a “culture of responsibility” through engag-
ing the global life sciences community, encouraging: (1) sus-
tained dialog on the development of behavioral norms; (2) the
development of a code of ethics; (3) the development of training
materials; and (4) efforts to explore community-based approaches
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Table 6 | Excluded bacterial and viral select agentsa.
Agent Strain Effective date
Avian influenza virus Recombinant vaccine reference strains of the H5N1 and H5N3 subtypes 05-07-2004
Bacillus anthracis Strains devoid of pX01 and pX02 02-27-2003
Bacillus anthracis Strains devoid of pX02 (Sterne) 02-27-2003
Brucella abortus Vaccine strain (∆norD∆znuA) 06-02-2011
Brucella abortus Vaccine strain S2308∆pgm 08-09-2006
Brucella abortus Vaccine strain 19 06-12-2003
Brucella abortus Vaccine strain RB51 05-07-2003
Burkholderia pseudomallei Bp82 (a ∆purM mutant of strain 1026b) 04-14-2010
Burkholderia pseudomallei B0011 (a ∆asd mutant of strain 1026b) 12-07-2011
Coxiella burnetii Nine Mile Strain Phase II, plaque purified clone 4 10-15-2003
Eastern equine encephalitis virus South American genotypes 12-04-2012
Ebola virus ∆VP30 replication incompetent virus 01-02-2013
Francisella tularensis subsp. novicida (F. novicida) Utah 112 (ATCC 15482) 02-27-2003
Francisella tularensis subsp. novicida (F. novicida) All strains 10-24-2014
Francisella novicida- like strains All strains 10-24-2014
Francisella tularensis subsp. holarctica LVS (live vaccine strain; includes NDBR 101 lots, TSI-GSD lots, and ATCC 29684) 02-27-2003
Francisella tularensis subsp. tularensis B-38 (ATCC 6223) 02-27-2003
Junin virus Vaccine strain Candid No. 1 02-07-2003
Lassa fever virus Mopeia/Lassa arenavirus construct ML-29 03-02-2005
Monkeypox virus West African clade of Monkeypox virus 12-04-2012
Rift Valley fever virus Vaccine strain MP-12 02-07-2003
Rift Valley fever virus Vaccine candidate strain ∆NSs-∆NSm-ZH501 03-12-2012
SARS-Coronavirus NATtrol™ treated SARS-CoV molecular controls 02-08-2013
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEE) Subtypes ID and IE 12-04-2012
VEE Vaccine candidate strain V3526 05-05-2003
VEE Vaccine strain TC-83 02-07-2003
Yersinia pestis Pgm− (∆pgm) e.g., EV or various substrains such as EV 76 03-14-2003
Yersinia pestis Lcr− (e.g., Tjiwidej S, CDC A1122) 02-27-2003
aDescriptions of the excluded agents can be found at http://www.selectagents.gov/Exclusions-usda.html, http://www.selectagents.gov/exclusions-hhs.html, and
http://www.selectagents.gov/exclusions-overlap.html. Excluded toxins (not listed here) can be found at the latter two websites.
for identifying and addressing irresponsible conduct. Codes of
conduct for the global sciences community are widespread. Many
apply to the individual (e.g., professional oaths and codes of
ethics) and workplace (e.g., recombinant DNA guidelines). Most
are voluntary, have minimal penalties and/or no mechanism for
ensuring compliance, and primarily rely on the ethical behavior
of the individual. The scientific community is best served by a
balanced approach between voluntary codes of conduct and reg-
ulations/laws that protect society from the misuse of BSATs, while
not hindering legitimate biological research.
Life science knowledge and technologies continues to advance
at a rapid pace,which presents challenges to regulations (e.g.,Select
Agent Regulations) that govern pathogen security. The total syn-
thesis of a viral genome and recovery of infectious viruses (Cello
et al., 2002), enhancing the virulence of a minimally virulent non-
select agent virus (Rosengard et al., 2002), and the creation of
a bacterial cell controlled by a chemically synthesized genome
(Gibson et al., 2010) are examples of technological advances that
could be used to circumvent the regulations. The ability to keep
up with these scientific advances will be a challenge that will
require both regulatory and non-regulatory approaches (National
Research Council, 2003).
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